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GENERIC SEPARABLE METRIC STRUCTURES
ALEXANDER USVYATSOV
Abstract. We compare three notions of genericity of separable metric structures. Our
analysis provides a general model theoretic technique of showing that structures are
generic in descriptive set theoretic (topological) sense and in measure theoretic sense.
In particular, it gives a new perspective on Vershik’s theorems on genericity and ran-
domness of Urysohn’s space among separable metric spaces.
1. Introduction
There are several ways to define the notion of a “generic” metric structure. In this
article we compare the model theoretic and two topological approaches to this question.
This work was motivated by Anatoly Vershik’s results on genericity and randomness of
the Urysohn space among separable metric spaces, Theorems 1 and 2 in [Ver02]. Vershik
considers the collection of all separable metric spaces as a topological space, let us call
it S. Some elements of S are (isometric to) the Urysohn space. Vershik shows that
this set is Gδ dense in S, which leads to the conclusion that the Urysohn space is in
a sense “a generic” separable metric space. Then he shows that for any “reasonable”
probability measure on S, the collection of metric spaces isometric to the Urysohn space
is of measure 1. This leads to the conclusion that the Urysohn space is in a sense “the
random” metric space.
In his talk at the workshop on the Urysohn space at Ben-Gurion University (May
2006), Vershik said that his results had been motivated by model theoretic properties
of the (countable) random graph, and that the theorems in [Ver02] are in some sense
the analogues of the appropriate facts in classical model theory, although the context is
different: instead of countable structures one deals with topological spaces of cardinality
the continuum. In this paper we aim to show that the analogy goes much farther.
Indeed, countable discrete structures are replaced in this context with separable metric
spaces, so classical model theory is not the appropriate general framework. We would
like to convince the reader that there exists a natural generalization of discrete first
order logic to the continuous context, in which Vershik’s results are the true analogues
of classical facts, the Urysohn space is an analogue of the random graph, and discrete
countable models are no more than a particular case of separable continuous structures.
So from our point of view, properties of the Urysohn space discovered by Vershik are
much more than results inspired by certain similarities between this structure and the
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random graph; in a sense, both of these are particular cases of the same model theoretic
phenomenon, which we intend to describe here.
Continuous first order logic, recently introduced by Ita¨ı Ben-Yaacov and the author
in [BU], allows one to study classes of metric spaces (maybe equipped with continuous
extra-structure, e.g. a collection of uniformly continuous functions from the spaces to
R) from model theoretic point of view. Once working in this context, many results
in classical model theory generalize to analytic structures. This paper is devoted to the
connection between model theory and descriptive set theory, which is very well-developed
in the classical context, i.e. studying Polish spaces of countable structures for a given
countable signature, countable models of a countable universal theory, etc. We will refer
the reader to the excellent expository paper by Greg Hjorth, [Hj04].
In addition to generalizing Vershik’s theorem to a broad collection of classes of metric
structures, our work generalizes a few basic concepts and results from classical first
order model theory to the continuous context and pushes out the boundaries of possible
applications of continuous logic. So although we intentionally try to make the article
accessible to non-logicians, it could also be of interest to model theorists.
Working in the context of continuous first model theory, we adapt some basic facts and
techniques from [Hj04] and show how one defines a Polish topology on the space of e.g. all
separable models of a certain universal continuous theory. Having done that, we discuss
three different notions of genericity of a structure. One is model theoretic, genericity of
a model of a universal theory among its peers). The other two are topological, genericity
of a structure as an element of the appropriate Polish space in two different ways: in the
sense of Baire category theory and in the sense of measure theory. Let us state things
more precisely.
Let K be a “reasonable” class of separable metric structures. In our context K will
normally be the class of all separable models of a certain universal continuous first order
theory. From the model theoretic point of view, a generic structure in K is a structure in
which “anything that can happen” inK happens. Such structures are called “existentially
closed” for K. We will give precise definitions later.
On the other hand, one can consider K as a Polish space (i.e. there is a natural
topology on K with respect to which K is a complete separable metric space). One can
call a structure “generic” for K in topological sense if its isomorphism class is a “big”
subset of K. One natural notion of “bigness” in this context is Gδ dense. Another one
comes from measure theory: one can consider natural measures on the space K and ask
what are the sets of measure 1.
In this article we have several primary goals:
(i) Introduce the general model theoretic framework and the relevant notion of
genericity.
(ii) Construct the Polish space of separable metric structures.
(iii) Connect the notions of genericity. More precisely, we explain how a model the-
oretic notion of genericity gives rise to Gδ dense sets in the appropriate Polish
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space S and sets of measure 1 with respect to any “reasonable” probability mea-
sure on S. In particular, this provides a powerful general technique for showing
that certain structures are topologically generic and random (as it allows us to
use well-developed model theoretic tools for this purpose).
(iv) Conclude with some examples. In particular, we discuss model theory of Urysohn
space and show that our results generalize Vershik’s theorems on its “topological”
genericity.
Acknowledgements. The author thanks the anonymous referee for very helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
2. Preliminaries and basics
2.1. Continuous logic. Continuous first order logic was introduced in [BU] and devel-
oped further by Ita¨ı Ben-Yaacov, Alexander Berenstein, C. Ward Henson and the author.
We refer the reader to [BBHU] for a detailed exposition. We will now try to summarize
some important basic notions, facts and notations.
Just as in classical predicate logic, one starts with a fixed signature (vocabulary) τ .
In this paper, τ will be countable. A signature (vocabulary) is a collection of function
symbols and predicate symbols as well as continuity moduli for all these symbols. There
is a distinguished predicate symbol d(x, y), which will correspond to the metric.
Given a vocabulary τ , one constructs the continuous language L which corresponds to
it, which consists of continuous first order τ -formulae. As in classical first order logic,
formulae are constructed by induction using connectives and quantifiers. Any countable
collection of continuous functions from [0, 1]k to [0, 1] (for any k) which is dense in the set
of all such continuous functions can be taken as the set of connectives. We will assume
that the following functions are among our connectives:
(i) The constant function q for every q ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q
(ii) pointwise minimum ([0, 1]2 → [0, 1])
(iii) pointwise maximum ([0, 1]2 → [0, 1])
(iv) Multiplication by q, [x 7→ x · q], for every q ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q ([0, 1]→ [0, 1])
(v) negation, [x 7→ 1− x], ([0, 1]→ [0, 1])
(vi) dotminus or implication: Truncated (at 0) minus [(x, y) 7→ x−· y] ([0, 1]2 → [0, 1])
(vii) Truncated (at 1) plus [(x, y) 7→ x+ y] ([0, 1]2 → [0, 1])
(viii) (x, y) 7→ |x− y| ([0, 1]2 → [0, 1])
Of course, some of the functions above can be defined using the others, but we are not
looking for “minimal” systems of connectives here.
The continuous quantifiers are infx and supx. As in classical first order logic, we only
allow quantification over elements.
So the following are examples of formulae:
• d(x, y)
• d(x, y)−· d(y, x)
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• infx,y d(x, y)
• supx,y,z(d(x, z)−· (d(x, y) + d(y, z)))
As usual, formulae with no “free variables” (i.e. each variable is in a scope of one
of the quantifiers) are called sentences. The first two formulae above are not sentences,
while the last two are.
An L-pre-structure is a setM equipped with interpretations for all τ -symbols such that
d is interpreted as a pseudometric, each predicate symbol is interpreted as a function from
(some power of)M to [0, 1], each function symbol is interpreted as a function from (some
power of) M to M , and all of them respect their continuity moduli with respect to d. In
other words:
• dM : M2 → [0, 1] is a pseudometric
• For every n-ary predicate symbol P , we have PM : Mn → [0, 1] uniformly con-
tinuous with respect to d (respecting the continuity modulus of P dictated by
τ)
• For every n-ary function symbol f , we have fM : Mn → M uniformly continuous
with respect to d (respecting the continuity modulus of f dictated by τ)
A structure is a pre-structure in which d is a complete metric.
See [BU] or [BBHU] for more details (on e.g. continuity moduli). Formal definitions of
these notions are not important for us here; but it is crucial that the interpretation of each
predicate symbol and of each function symbol is uniformly continuous, and uniformly so
in all L-structures (this is what we need the continuity moduli for). Uniform continuity
allows us to take ultraproducts of L-structures and obtain e.g. compactness of first order
continuous logic.
Note that given a structure M , one can easily define (by induction) the M-value of ϕ
for any sentence ϕ. We will denote this value by ϕM (it is a real number in the interval
[0, 1]).
Note also that there is no particular importance for the interval [0, 1], but every pred-
icate symbol must have bounded range (again, so that ultraproducts will work), and by
rescaling we may assume it is in fact always [0, 1].
A condition is a statement concerning the value of a sentence ϕ. For example, ϕ ≤ ε,
ϕ = 0, ϕ < ε are conditions (where ε ∈ [0, 1]). We will call conditions of the form ϕ ≤ ε,
ϕ = 0, etc closed conditions and those of the form ϕ < ε, etc open conditions.
Note that as we will mostly work with conditions of the form ϕ ≤ ε and ϕ < ε, the
continuous quantifiers infx and supx can be viewed as analogues of the existential and
the universal quantifiers respectively.
It is clear what it means for a structure M to satisfy a condition α, and we write
M |= α. If every structure which satisfies α also satisfies β , we say that β follows from
α and write α |= β. If Λ is a collection of conditions and M is a structure, we say that
M is a model for (of) Λ if M satisfies every condition in Λ, and write M |= Λ.
A theory T is a collection of closed conditions which is consistent (i.e. there is a
structure M which satisfies all the conditions in T , M |= T ). We will always assume that
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theories are closed under entailment, i.e. if α ∈ T and α |= β, then β ∈ T . We denote
by Mod(T ) the class of all models of T .
We encourage the reader to have a look at examples of continuous languages and
theories presented in [BU] and [BBHU].
We shall not discuss ultraproduct constructions in this paper. Again, curious readers
are referred to [BU] or [BBHU]. An important consequence is the Compactness Theorem
for continuous logic, which will be useful for us:
Fact 2.1. (Compactness Theorem) Let Λ be a collection of closed conditions which is
finitely satisfiable (i.e. every finite subset of Λ has a model). Then Λ has a model.
LetM ⊆ N be L-structures. We say thatM is an elementary submodel of N (M ≺ N)
if for every L-sentence ϕ we have ϕM = ϕN . We say that a theory T is model complete
if for every M,N |= T , M ⊆ N ⇒ M ≺ N . Most theories are not model complete; we
will discuss this notion more later. T is model complete if (but not only if) it eliminates
quantifiers ; see more in [BU] or [BBHU].
Note that continuous first order logic is a natural generalization of classical first order
logic. Indeed, every classical first order theory can be viewed as a continuous theory in
which the metric is discrete.
2.2. Polish space of separable continuous structures. Let τ be a fixed countable
continuous vocabulary. For simplicity we assume that τ is relational (i.e. no function
symbols). Let L be the corresponding (countable) continuous language. We denote the
space of all L-continuous separable structures M with a distinguished countable dense
subset N ⊆ M by S. Consider the following topology on S: basic open sets are of the
form Uϕ(x¯),a¯,ε = Uϕ(a¯),ε = {M ∈ S : ϕ
M(a¯) < ε} where ϕ(x¯) is a quantifier free L-formula,
a¯ ∈ N, ε ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {∞}.
Proposition 2.2. S with the topology above is a Polish space.
Proof. Let 〈Ri : i < ω〉 be an enumeration of τ , R0 being the metric. Let ki be the arity
of Ri (so k0 = 2).
By section 2 of [Hj04] the product space
X = [0, 1]
F
i
Nki
is Polish. We can view S as a subspace of X via the following embedding φ : S→ X :
φ(M) = 〈fi : i < ω〉 such that fi is precisely R
M
i on the dense subset N of M .
Note that the fact that R0 is a pseudometric and all the rest of the predicates respect
the appropriate continuity moduli with respect to it is a collection of closed conditions.
The fact that R0 is an actual metric can be expressed as a collection of open conditions.
So S can be viewed as a Gδ subset of a Polish space, and therefore, by Lemma 2.2 in
[Hj04], S is a Polish space itself. qed2.2
Let T be an L-theory. We denote the space of all elements of S which are models of
T by ST . So S = S∅.
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2.3. Universal theories and existentially closed models.
Definition 2.3. (i) We call a theory universal if it is (the closure under entailment
of) a collection of conditions of the form [supx¯ ϕ(x¯) = 0] where ϕ is quantifier
free.
(ii) Let K be a class of L-structures. We call M ∈ K existentially closed for K if
the following holds: for every M ⊆ N ∈ K, a quantifier free formula ϕ(x, y¯) and
a tuple b¯ ∈M , we have infMx ϕ(x, b¯) = inf
N
x ϕ(x, b¯).
(iii) If T is a universal theory we say that M |= T is existentially closed for T if it is
existentially closed for K = Mod(T ). When T is clear from the context we omit
it and say “M is existentially closed” or “M is an e.c. structure” or “M is an
e.c. model”.
Remark 2.4. ForM ∈ K, to be existentially closed for K means in a sense that anything
which is quantifier free definable with parameters in M , that can happen in some model
in K, happens already in M . In this sense, existentially closed models are “generic”
among structures in K.
Example 2.5. (i) Atomless probability algebras are existentially closed among all
probability algebras (see [BU] or [BBHU]).
(ii) Hilbert spaces equipped with a unitary operator U with full spectrum (Spec(U) =
S1) are e.c. among all Hilbert spaces equipped with a unitary operator, see
[BUZ].
(iii) Atomless probability algebras with an aperiodic automorphism are e.c. among
probability algebras equipped with an automorphism, see [BH].
Let T be a universal theory, K = Mod(T ), and Kec be the class of e.c. models of T .
We call Kec the continuous Robinson theory of T . One may ask: is Kec elementary (i.e.
is there a continuous theory T ∗ such that Kec = Mod(T ∗))? The answer is not always
positive, even in the classical (discrete) context. For example, the Robinson theory of
groups (i.e. T is collection of first order sentences which are true in all groups, K is
the class of all groups, and Kec consists of all groups which are existentially closed) is
not elementary. But often the answer is yes; in this case we say that T admits a model
companion and call T ∗ the model companion of T .
It is easy to see that in this case T ∗ is model complete: if M,N |= T ∗ and M ⊆ N ,
then M ≺ N . It does not necessarily eliminate quantifiers; if it does, we call it the model
completion of T .
Remark 2.6. In Example 2.5 above, the classes of e.c. models are in fact elementary, and
the appropriate theories are the model companions, and even the model completions of
the universal theories.
Observation 2.7. Let T be a universal theory. Then ST is a closed subset of S, and
therefore a Polish space.
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Proof. Clear. qed2.7
The following fact is well-known, but the author is not aware of a written reference.
Although the proof is identical to that of the classical (discrete) analogue, we include it for
completeness. In order not to scare the reader, we only deal with separable structures,
which is all we need in this article (the proof for an arbitrary infinite cardinality is
essentially the same).
Fact 2.8. Let T be a universal theory, M |= T separable. Then there exists a separable
N ⊇M , N |= T , N is e.c. for T .
Proof. The proof is standard and resembles very much the construction of the algebraic
closure of a given field.
Let M0 =M . We construct separable Mi |= T for i < ω by induction as follows:
Given Mi let 〈ϕα(x¯α) : α < ω〉 be an enumeration of all quantifier free formulae ϕ(x¯)
with parameters inMi. Now define a sequence M
α
i of separable models of T by induction
on α < ω as follows:
• M0i =Mi
• Given Mαi , if there is no a¯ ∈ Mi satisfying [ϕα(a¯) = 0], but there exists M
′ ⊇
Mαi , M
′ |= T where such a¯ exists, let Mα+1i be any such separable M
′ (for the
cardinality preservation one can use e.g. Proposition 7.3 in [BBHU]).
Otherwise let Mα+1i =M
α
i .
Now define Mi+1 = ∪α<λMαi . Note that Mi+1 has the following property: if there exists
a quantifier free formula ϕ(x¯) with parameters in Mi, an extension M
′ |= T of Mi+1 and
a¯ ∈M ′ satisfying [ϕ(a¯) = 0], then such a¯ exists already in Mi+1.
Finally, let N = ∪i<ωMi; it is easy to check that it is existentially closed.
qed2.8
3. Inductive theories
Recall that we assume that theories are closed under entailment, i.e. every closed
condition which follows from T is already in T . We denote by T o the collection of all
open conditions which follow from T . Let T oc = T ∪ T o.
Let T be an L-theory and let ∆ be collection of conditions (open or/and closed). We
denote by T∆ the ∆-part of T . So T∆ = T
oc ∩ ∆ For an L-structure M , we denote the
∆-part of Th(M) by Th∆(M).
As usual, we define Σn and Πn formulae by induction on n:
• Σ0 = Π0 = quantifier free formulae
• Σn+1 is the collection of formulae of the form inf x¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) where ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ Πn
• Πn+1 is the collection of formulae of the form supx¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) where ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ Σn
Remark 3.1. So Σ1 is the collection of all the existential formulae, Π1 is the collection of
all the universal formulae.
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Definition 3.2. (i) For Λ ⊆ L, we denote by Λo the collection of all open conditions
of the form ϕ < ε for ϕ ∈ Λ, ε > 0.
(ii) For Λ ⊆ L, we denote by Λc the collection of all closed conditions of the form
ϕ ≤ ε for ϕ ∈ Λ, ε > 0.
(iii) Let ∆ be a collection of conditions. We call a theory T a ∆-theory if T∆ |= T .
(iv) We call a theory T inductive if it is axiomatizable by open conditions of the
form supx¯ inf y¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) < ε, where ϕ is quantifier-free. So T is inductive if it is a
Πo2-theory.
Remark 3.3. (i) So a theory T is universal iff it is a ∆-theory for ∆ = Πc1.
(ii) Maybe the reader would expect us to work with Πc2-theories instead of Π
o
2. Note
that if T is Πc2 then it is inductive, and for complete theories the notions are
equivalent; but as we want Theorem 3.6 to hold for all theories, not necessarily
complete, and as we want our theories to define Gδ subsets of S, the natural
choice is open conditions.
Lemma 3.4. Let ∆ = Σon or ∆ = Π
o
n for some n (or just ∆ is a collection of open condi-
tions closed under rescaling, i.e. multiplication by scalars and the “pointwise minimum”
connective). Let T be a theory and suppose that for every two L-structures M,N such
that M |= T and Th∆(M) ⊆ Th∆(N), we have N |= T . Then T is a ∆-theory.
Proof. Suppose not; so there exists N |= T∆, N 6|= T . By the assumption, for no M |= T
do we have Th∆(M) ⊆ Th∆(N). In other words, for every M |= T there exists a formula
ϕM with [ϕM < ε] ∈ ∆ such that ϕ
M
M < ε, ϕ
N
M ≥ ε. By rescaling we may assume ε =
1
2
.
So the set T ∪{[ϕM ≥
1
2
] : M |= T} is inconsistent. By compactness, [minki=1 ϕi <
1
2
] ∈
T o for some finite collection of such ϕi. But ∆ is closed under taking minima, and every
one of the conditions [ϕi <
1
2
] is in ∆, so (as N |= T∆), (min
k
i=1 ϕi)
N < 1
2
, so for some i
ϕNi < ε, a contradiction. qed3.4
Lemma 3.5. Let T be a complete L-theory and M an L-structure with ThΣcn(M) ⊆ TΣcn.
Then there exists M ′ |= T and a Σn-elementary embedding f : M →M
′.
Proof. Let M = 〈aα : α < λ〉, M
′ a λ-saturated model of T . Construct fα : Aα =
{aβ : β < α} → M
′ an increasing continuous sequence of Σn-elementary embeddings.
Given fα, consider the Σn-type in M of aα over Aα, call it pi(x). By the assumption that
ThΣcn ⊆ T , f(pi(x)) is a type in M
′ over f(Aα) (as Σn is closed under “inf”), and use the
saturation of M ′. qed3.5
Theorem 3.6. Let T be an L-theory such that Mod(T ) is preserved under unions of
chains, that is if 〈Mi : i < ω〉 is an increasing chain of models of T , then the closure of
the union M =
⋃
iMi is also a model of T . Then T is inductive.
Proof. Suppose Mod(T ) is closed under unions of chains. We would like to show that
TΠo
2
|= T .
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Let M |= T and T ′ a complete L-theory extending TΠo
2
, N |= T ′ with ThΠo
2
(M) ⊆ T ′
We will show that N |= T , which clearly suffices by Lemma 3.4.
Construct a chain N0 ⊆M1 ⊆ N1 ⊆ . . . such that:
(i) N0 = N
(ii) Mi |= T , Ni |= T
′
(iii) Ni ≺ Ni+1
If the construction is possible, we are done:
Let M =
⋃
iMi =
⋃
iNi. M |= T by the assumption on T and (ii) above. On the
other hand, clearly N0 ≺ M (as N0 ≺ Ni for all i by (iii) above), so N = N0 |= T , and
we are done.
Why is the construction possible?
Let N0 = N . As ThΠo
2
(M) ⊆ Th(N) = T ′, we have ThΣc
2
(N) ⊆ Th(M), so by Lemma
3.5, there exists M0 |= Th(M) and a Σ
c
2-embedding of N0 into M0.
Let N0 = 〈aα : α < λ〉. Enrich the vocabulary τ with λ-many constant symbols, call
the new language L′.
Claim 3.6.1. ThΣc
1
(M0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) as L
′-theories.
Proof. Clearly (as N0 is a Σ
c
2-elementary submodel of M0), ThΣc2(N0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) ⊆
Th(M0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) as L
′-theories, and therefore ThΠo
2
(M0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα :
α < λ〉) as L′-theories, in particular
(1) ThΣo
1
(M0, 〈aα : α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα : α < λ〉)
as L′-theories.
Let [inf x¯ ψ(x¯, a¯) ≤ ε] be a closed existential condition satisfied by M0 with parameters
a¯ ∈ N0 (i.e. a¯ = aα1 , . . . , aαk for some α1, . . . , αk < λ). Then M0 |= [inf x¯ ψ(x¯, a¯) < ε
′]
for every ε′ > ε. So this is true in N0 (by (1) above), which completes the proof of the
claim.
qed3.6
By the Claim above and Lemma 3.5, there exists N1 |= T
′ into which M0 is Σ
c
1-
embedded in the language L′. Clearly, this means that N0 ≺ N1.
The rest of the construction is similar.
qed3.6
We obtain the analogue of a well-known Robinson’s theorem in the continuous context:
Corollary 3.7. If T is model complete, then it is inductive.
Corollary 3.8. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then T ′
is inductive.
Proof. T ′ is model complete. qed3.8
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4. Generic and random models
4.1. Model completions and topological genericity.
Observation 4.1. Let T ′ be an inductive theory. Then ST ′ is a Gδ subset of S.
Proof. For every quantifier free formula ϕ(x¯), a¯, b¯ ∈ N and ε > 0, the open condition
[ϕ(a¯, b¯) < ε] defines an open subset of S, which we called Uϕ(a¯,b¯),ε. The open con-
dition [inf x¯ ϕ(x¯, b¯) < ε] corresponds, therefore, to an open subset of S, which equals⋃
a¯∈N Uϕ(a¯,b¯),ε. A Π
o
2 condition defines a subset of S which is a (countable) intersection
(over all possible b¯ ∈ N) of sets as above; therefore it is a Gδ set. Clearly, a countable
collection of Πo2 conditions still corresponds to a Gδ set. qed4.1
Fact 4.2. Let T be a universal theory. Then the collection of separable e.c. models is
dense in ST .
Proof. By Fact 2.8 every separable M |= T can be extended to a separable e.c. model
M ′ |= T . Now it is easy to see that one can rename the elements ofM ′ such that a certain
finite a¯ ∈ N remains unchanged (and so M ′ is indeed in a specified open neighborhood
of M in ST ). qed4.2
Corollary 4.3. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then ST ′
is a Gδ dense subset of ST .
Recall that a theory T is called ℵ0-categorical if any two separable models of T are
isomorphic.
Definition 4.4. Let T be a universal theory. We callM ∈ ST generic if the isomorphism
class of M is Gδ dense in ST .
Corollary 4.5. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′, and assume
T ′ is ℵ0-categorical. Then (any) existentially closed model of T is generic in ST .
Proof. By Corollary 4.3, ST ′ is Gδ dense in ST . By ℵ0- categoricity of T
′, ST ′ is the
isomorphism class of any e.c. model of T (which is in ST ). qed4.5
4.2. Random structures. Once we have shown that the class of existentially closed
models in S is “big” in the sense of Baire category theory, a natural question is: is
there a similar measure-theoretic result? In [Ver02] Vershik shows that the Urysohn
space is in a sense the random metric space. We know that the model companion of
the universal theory of graphs is the random graph. Are these facts particular cases of a
model theoretic phenomenon?
Let T be a universal theory, µ a probability measure on ST satisfying
Assumption 4.6. (i) No nonempty open set has probability 0.
(ii) µ is invariant under the action of S∞ on ST . In other words, for every formula
ϕ(x¯), ε > 0 and a¯, b¯ ∈ N, we have the equality µ(Uϕ(a¯),ε) = µ(Uϕ(b¯),ε). So
µ(Uϕ(a¯),ε) does not depend on a¯.
GENERIC SEPARABLE METRIC STRUCTURES 11
Clearly, these are very natural assumptions on a measure on ST , once we are interested
in “random structures”: first, we assume that if a certain open event occurs in some model
of T , then its probability is positive. Second, we assume that in a sense isomorphic models
“occur” with equal probability.
Lemma 4.7. Let µ be as above. Then the set of all existentially closed structures in ST
has probability 1. In other words, if we pick a structure “randomly”, it is going to be
existentially closed almost surely.
Proof. Let M be a randomly chosen structure. We aim to show that with probability 1
it is existentially closed. Let ϕ(x¯) be a formula, and suppose that in some M ⊆ N |= T
we have infNx¯ ϕ(x¯) ≤ ε. Let ε
′ > ε. So there exists a¯ ∈ N such that ϕN(a¯) < ε′, and
therefore µ(Uϕ(a¯),ε′) = δ > 0. By the invariance of µ, µ(Uϕ(b¯),ε′) = δ for every b¯ ∈ N, and
so the probability that in a randomly chosen structure M we have ϕM(b¯) ≥ ε′ is bounded
away from 1 for each b¯ ∈M .
Now clearly with probability 1 for some b¯ ∈ M we have ϕM(b¯) < ε′, therefore
infMx¯ ϕ(x¯) ≤ ε almost surely, and we are done. qed4.7
Remark 4.8. Note that we did not really use the invariance of µ. We only need that the
probability of the event Uϕ(a¯),ε is either 0 for all a¯ or bounded away from 0 for all a¯.
Corollary 4.9. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then ST ′
is a set of probability 1 in ST .
Definition 4.10. We call a separable model of a universal theory T random if the
measure of its isomorphism class in ST is 1 with respect to any probability measure µ as
in Assumption 4.6. In other words, M is a random model of T if for every µ as above, a
randomly chosen structure in ST is almost surely isomorphic to M .
Just like in Corollary 4.5 we obtain:
Corollary 4.11. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Assume
furthermore that T ′ is ℵ0-categorical. Then any separable model of T
′ is a random model
of T .
Clearly, this generalizes the “randomness” of the countable random graph; see more
in the following subsection.
4.3. Concluding remarks on genericity. In this section we have shown that the
model theoretic notion of genericity gives rise to both Baire category theoretical and
measure theoretical notions of genericity in the space S. In other words, we have shown:
Corollary 4.12. Let T be a universal theory which admits a model companion T ′. Then
ST ′ is both Gδ dense in S and of measure 1 with respect to any reasonable measure on
S (i.e. any measure satisfying Assumption 4.6).
In particular, we have the following:
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Corollary 4.13. Suppose T is a universal theory which has a model companion T ′, and
assume furthermore that T ′ is ℵ0-categorical. Then the (unique up to isomorphism) model
of T ′ is both the generic and the random model of T .
Example 4.14. The atomless separable probability algebra is both the generic and the
random separable probability algebra.
Proof. The theory of atomless probability algebras is the model companion of the uni-
versal theory of probability algebras by [BU]. It is also ℵ0-categorical, so apply Corollary
4.13. qed4.14
As we have already mentioned, every classical first order theory is a continuous first
order theory with discrete metric. We can therefore apply our analysis to e.g. the theory
of the random graph. Recall that the theory of the random graph is the model completion
of the universal theory of graphs.
Example 4.15. The random graph is the generic countable graph.
Proof. The (classical) first order theory of the random graph is the model completion
(and therefore the model companion) of the universal theory of graphs. It us also ℵ0-
categorical. So the desired conclusion follows from Corollary 4.13. qed4.15
Similarly, the unique countable model of the model completion of the universal theory
of graphs is the random graph in the sense defined here in Definition 4.10. Well, no
surprise here: we’re just saying that the random graph is, well, random.
In the following section we will show that the continuous first order theory of the
Urysohn space has similar properties, and therefore Corollary 4.13 applies to it as well.
One can think of this theory as the continuous analogue of the theory of the random
graph: instead of the discrete predicate R(x, y) in the theory of graphs which can be
either true or false, we have a metric which can take any value between 0 and 1.
5. Urysohn space
Many results on the model theory of the Urysohn space here are “folklore”, but the
author is not aware of any written references. In order to follow the proofs, the reader
should be familiar with basics of continuous model theory slightly beyond what is sketched
in section 2 of the article.
We remind the reader that the Urysohn space is the universal complete separable
metric space, first constructed by Pavel Urysohn. Due to the limitations of the genre, we
will consider the bounded Urysohn space, i.e. Urysohn space of diameter 1. We denote
it by U.
Denote by En the collection of all possible distance configurations on n points of
diameter 1. It will be convenient for us to think about it in the following way:
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ϑ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ En if ϑ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of the form∨
1≤i,j≤k
|d(xi, xj)− rij|
where the matrix (rij)1≤i,j≤k is a distance matrix of some finite metric space of diameter
1, and
∨
stands for the lattice operation of pointwise maximum.
Let us introduce the following notation: for ϑ ∈ En+1, let ϑ↾n be the restriction of ϑ
to the first n variables.
Clearly, for every ϑ ∈ En+1, for every ε > 0 there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that
if a1, . . . , an ∈ U satisfy ϑ↾n(a1, . . . , an) < δ, then there exists an+1 ∈ U such that
ϑ(a1, . . . , an, an+1) ≤ ε.
Let TU be the collection of all the conditions of the form[
sup
x1,...,xn
inf
y
(
ε
1− δ
(1− ϑ↾n(x1, . . . , xn))
∧
ϑ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
)
≤ ε
]
which is just one way of stating
∀x1, . . . xn∃y(ϑ↾n(x1, . . . , xn) < δ → ϑ(x1, . . . , xn, y) ≤ ε)
Note that
∧
stands for the lattice operation of pointwise minimum.
The following follows from the standard Urysohn’s argument:
Fact 5.1. The only separable complete model of TU is U.
Corollary 5.2. TU is ℵ0-categorical, and therefore a complete continuous theory.
Proof. By (the continuous version of) Vaught’s test. qed5.2
Proposition 5.3. TU eliminates quantifiers.
Proof. By the classical back-and-forth argument (see Theorem 4.16 in [BU]) using the
axioms of TU. qed5.3
Corollary 5.4. TU is the model completion (and therefore the model companion) of the
“empty” continuous universal theory (the universal theory of a metric space with no
extra-structure). U is (the only) existentially closed metric space.
A natural conclusion from our analysis is the following form of Vershik’s theorems:
Corollary 5.5. The Urysohn space (of diameter 1) is the generic and the random metric
space (of diameter 1).
Proof. The theory of the Urysohn space is the model companion of the universal theory
of metric spaces and is ℵ0-categorical, so the result follows immediately from Corollary
4.13. qed5.5
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